




The "turbulent world e_;onomy," to use the terminology of the
theme for this meeting, has in recent years presented difficult prob-
lems to nearly every sector of the Philippine economy. In terms of
the likely impact on the country's long-term economic development,
the problem occasioned by the recent and prospective decline in the
growth rate of Philippine exports may prove to be the most serious,
since it now threatens to undermine domestic policy efforts, initiated
in the early 1970's, to promote labor-intensive, export-led industrial
development.
The strategy of outward-oriented industrialization and the en-
couragement of labor-intensive industries find theoretical justifica-
tion in classical comparative advantage and developmenttheory.
Given the relative abundance of unskilled, low-wage labor in most
developing countries like the Philippines, comparative.advantage lies
in the production and export of labor-intensive products, and this
could contribute to efficient resource allocation and rapid economic
growth. Since the world market is virtually limitless for a small
country, export producers would be able to exploit significant econ-
omies of scale, adding to the improvement in industrial produc-
tivity. Also, to the extentthat unemployment and underemployment
exist, the concomitant expansion of-job opportunities in labor-inten-
sive industries should help raise the standard of living of the poorest
segments of the population. With the mopping up of surplus labor
over time, a "commercialization point" will be eventually reached,
after which further increases in labor demand relative to supply will
force a rising trend in real wages,shifting the developing country's
comparative advantage toward more skill- and capital-intensive prod-
ucts.
The development performance in the 1960's of the super-ex-
porters of labor-intensive manufa_ured products - the so-called
Asian NlCs, especially.Taiwanand South Korea (which, in contrast
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to the city statesof Hong Kong and Singapore,are intermediate-sized
economies) - appears to provide empirical support to the above
model of trade and development. "Per capita real incomes in these
countries have increasedvery rapidly and masspoverty haslargely
• disappeared;there hasbeen massiveabsorption of labor into the in-
dustrial sector and full employment haslargely beenachieved" (Lee
1981, p. 21). Most remarkable of all, thesewere accomplishedwithin
a periodof lessthan a decade.
By the early 1970's, the Asian NlCs havebegunto shift resources
toward the production and export of more skill- and capital-inten-
sive products. Beginningat about that time also, labor-intensiveout-
ward-looking industrialdevelopment becameincreasinglyemphasized
in some developingcountries, inspiredby the earlierachievementsof
the Asian NlCs. In the Philippines, relative incentives to export-
oriented industries improved significantly with the 1970 de facto de-
valuation of the peso,accompanied by discriminatory "stabilization"
measuresfavoring nontraditional (manufactured) exports,1 and the
enactment of the Export Incentives Act in the sameyear. Apart from
the fiscal incentives made available to export-oriented enterprises
which were additional to those already beinggivento BOI-registered
firms under the Investment IncentivesAct of 1967, the Export Incen-
tives Act servedto officially elevateexport production to the highest
priority, which meant favorable treatment in accessto institutional
credit and in import licensing,to mention only two major benefits
accorded industrial export producers. Several measureswere also
subsequently adopted in line with export infrastructure develop-
ment favoring export producers of nontraditional manufactured
products.
The point of the above discussionis that, in contrast with the
industrial and trade policies in the preceding two decadeswhich
effectively promoted inward-looking industrial development, the
1. The floating of thepesoin February1970resulted in anexchange rate
change from3.9 to 6.4 pesos perU.S.dollar withintheyear.Exporters oftradi-
tionalexportproducts, however, wererequired to convert 80 percent of their
• foreignexchange earnings at the old rate.Thisdualexchange ratearrangement
waslaterreplaced by taxesontraditional exportsof ratesranging from4 to 10
percent ad valorem.Theseexporttaxesweremadea partof the customs and
tariffcodein 1973.In February 1974,anadditional taxwasintroduced, based
onthe premium derived fromexportpriceincreases beginning 1973.Thus,the
windfallgains fromthe devaluation andthe commodity boomin theearlypart
of the seventies werepartiallysiphoned offfromproducers of traditional export
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early 1970% witnessed a considerable improvement in the incentive
structure for exporting, especially of new industrial products-
which quantitative estimates of various relative incentive measures
bearout.2
It is not surprising,therefore, that Philippine exports grewmuch
more rapidly in the 1970% than in the 1960% (7.0 percent vs. 2.2
percent annually in volume terms, basedon World Bank data). More
important, there was a dramatic increasein the share of nontradi-
tional export products, especially labor-intensive manufactures.
Manufactured products as a percentage of total exports increased
from 8.3 percent in 1970 to 36.4 percent in 1980. The average
annual growth of manufacturing value added in real terms also in-
creased-from 6.7 percent in the 1960% to 7.2 percent in the 1970's.
In termsof overallgrowth, real GNP roseat an averageannual rateof
6.2 percent during 1970-79, which is significantly higher than the
correspondingfigure of 5.1 percent for 1960-70. While thesecom-
parativestatisticsdo not establishthe superiority of outward-looking
to inward-oriented industrial development, they are consistentwith
the well-establishedempirical associationbetween "superior export
performance" and "superior economicperformance" among develop-
ing countries (at least in terms of the growth rate of real national
income).3 It is also to be noted that improvements in export and
output performance occurred at a time of increasedinstability in the
world economy (relative to the 1950% and 1960's) and rising pro-
tectionismin developedcountry markets.
In the last few years, however,growth of both total exportsand
grossnational product sharply decelerated. In 1981 export earnings
evenfell slightly (by 1.2 percent) while the growth rate of realGNP
declined to 3.8 percent (compared to the correspondingfigures of
6.7 percent in 1979 and 4.4 percent in 1981). Nevertheless,nontra-
ditional manufactured exports continued to increaserapidly, al-
though also at declining rates:41.3 percent in 1979, 38.7 percent in
1980 and 23.8 percent in 1981 at current dollar prices.Indications
are that for 1982 the country's exports and real GNP will perform no
2. For example,Baldwin's(1975) estimates for 1970-71werehigherby
40 percent for traditional exports and65percent for newexports relative tothe
corresponding a_erage estimates during 1967-69.
3. See,for example, theverycompetent survey of relatedempirical litera-
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better. The sluggishgrowth of industrial economies since 1980, the
intensification of protectionism in developed country markets, and
the steep decline in world pricesof traditional export productshave
beencommonly citedasthe underlying reasons.
Recent economic policy hastried to move the economy towards
greater competitiveness and efficiency. One areaof major policy re-
form is in tariffs. Scheduled changesin tariff ratesduring 1981-85
are comprehensive and significant which, if fully implemented, will
leadto a relatively substantialtariff liberalization by 1985, in terms
of both the overall reduction in effective protection and the narrow-
ingof the disparitiesin sectoralrates(Bautista 1982). Import licensing
isalso beingliberalized, and a realignmentof indirect•taxes is being
consideredthat will remove the protective effect result,ng from the
different taxation of domestically-produced and imported goods.
Finally, a "revitalization program" isbeingadopted to assistexisting
industriesto produce at lower cost basedon "positive" (e.g.techni-
cal assistanceandfinancing) rather than "negative" (protective) rr=ea-
sures.
The government has apparently decided to follow in earnestthe
developmenttrack of the now more advanceddeveloping countries,
particularly the Asian NlCs, characterizedby a liberal foreign trade
•regime and outward-looking policies.(The important point that
should not be missedby Philippine policymakers, it seemsto me, is
that the Asian NICs accorded export_producersa virtual free trade
regime, in someinstanceseven overcompensatingthem for any appa-
•rent bias of relative incentives against exporting, which served to
place them on at leastequalfooting with competitors in foreign mar-
kets.) This can be viewedasa logicalsequelto the export promotion
drive of the last decade which, despite its unsystematic character,
contributed to the improved performance of the export sector and
the national economy. It is perhaps not farfetched to hypothesize
that, had this kind of policy reform been implemented in the early
1960's (which was also the time when most of the Asian NlCs were
initiating policy shifts from import substitution to export promo-
tion), the country" might have registered much higher economic
growth• rates in the last two decades.But this is of coursenow an
academicquestion.
What would be usefulto examine hereishow future prospectsof
the Philippine•economy might be influenced by the on-going struc-
tural adjustment program.In a highgrowth scenariofor the industrial
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exports, there is little question that the long-term payoff to the cur-
rent policy reforms is Substantial and positive-in terms of improved
allocative efficiency and growth of the national economy. It isalso
likely, i think, that the employment and equity repercussions would
be favorable, as the experience of the Asian NlCs since the early
1960's has demonstrated. But, of course,there are other more .effi-
cient means, in the arsenal of government policy instruments, of
influencing income and wealth distribution than a changein trade
policy.
The question arises,however, of whether increasedopennessisa
desirable objective for the Philippinesif the industrialized countries
continue to suffer from low growth ratesand the internationalecon-
omy grows more unstable. Indeed, not a few growth economists
subscribeto the view that many of the forces underlying the recent
slowdown in the industrializedcountries are long term in character,
deeply embedded already in the structure and institutions of the
West (Oshima 1980). Already, we candiscernstrongvoicesfrom do-
mestic manufacturers arguing for a delay in the implementation of
the industrial restructuring program, particularly the tariff reform
and import licensing components, on ground of financial-distress
under current recessionaryconditions. There arealsovoicesthat call
for an outright reversal of export-oriented industrialization into an
inward-oriented developmentstrategy.
My own view is that we cannot afford to postponerationalizing
the country's industrial structure, especiallysincefinancial and tech-
nical assistance seemsavailable to industrieswith long-termviability.
Domestic resourcesneed to be utilized more efficiently regardless
of what may happen in the externaisector. This canonly contribute
to making the economy more responsiveand adaptive to changing
parameters in the international economic environment. That the
Northeast Asian countries, which are poorly endowed in natural
resourcesper capita, had been able to sustain more than satisfac-
tory economic performance despite the adversitiesthat confronted
them during the last decade owes much to the discipline and cost
consciousnessthat the spur of international competition has re-
quired of domestic producers, which in turn helped develop their
ability to react to change, whether originating abroad or at home,
adapting to new situations in an economic fashion. Unless the
Philippine economy acquiressuch "capacity to transform/ ' it is un-
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tained in a world of rapidly changingeconomic parameters.
The possibility of lower economic growt_hrates in the industria-
lized countries does not imply that the efficiency with which do-
mestic resourcesare being used no longer matters. The need to im-
port a large component of producer goods used by domestic indus-
tries gives added urgency to earn and save foreign exchange effi-
ciently, which would hardly be facilitated by a return to protection-
ist policies. To the problem of increasing trade restrictions in the
industrialized countries, the solution is not to turn inward and pro-
tect heavily the domestic market, which past Philippine experience
has shown to be very costly. The better means is to expand export
markets elsewhere. Some possible directions present themselves
which I think should be pursuedactively at this time of increasing
uncertainty concerningfuture accessto developedcountry markets.
The main point is that the slowingclownof the industrial economies
doesnot necessarilyimply stagnationin foreign trade and economic
activity for developingcountrieslike the Philippines in the future.
First, efforts could be madeto promote greatercomplementarity
in production and expandedtrade amongthe ASEAN countries. This
would require a substantial reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers
to trade within the region. The presentpreferential trading arrange-
ment (PTA) needs to be overhauled to allow for automatic, across-
the-board and meaningful tariff cuts, perhaps eventually leading to
the establishmentof a free trade area,and for the elimination of non-
tariff restrictions in intra-ASEAN trade. Also, ASEAN country
governmentsneed to effectively coordinate national plans,especially
concerning heavy industries where scale economies have to be
exploited to achieve international competitiveness,so that regional
demand could at least be assured.Harmonization of national indus-
trial projects would require, it seemsto me, a greater degreeof poli-
tical goodwill among the ASEAN countries than hasbeen displayed
thus far by their governments.
A broader area of inter-developing country cooperation in pro-
duction and tradewould be necessary,I think, to effectively offset
the increasinglyrestrictive access to developedcountry markets.The
most logical sourceof inter-LDC trade expansion at this time would
be between the ASEAN countries and the Asian NICs, which have
two of the world's highestregional income growth rates in the last
decade.Liberalization of trade amongthese countrieswould provide
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the world, in much the same way that the opening up •ofthe indus-
trialized countries for two decades after the Second World War led
to •unprecedented growth not only of those countries but also of the
NIC economies in that period.
As a final point, one aspect of current industrial policy that I
find incompatible with the larger thrust toward achieving gains in
allocative efficiency relates to the vigorous promotion of several
large-scale,capital-intensive industrial projects. This is due to a desire
for "balanced industrial development," perhaps as a reaction to the
recently observed deceleration in the export growth of light industry
products. Obviously, these projects would not employ much of the
country's underutilized labor force and, if they are not coordinated
with similar projects of other ASEAN countries, very few (perhaps
only those based on domestic raw materials and not subject to rapid
technological change) stand a chance of becoming commercially
viable without heavy protection from foreign competition. A highly
protected heavy industries sector, inevitably producing higher-priced
and lower quality intermediate industrial products (compared to
what can be imported), will be a drag in the growth of-downstream
industries which are typically more labor-intensive and less energy-
using and have a greater potential for exports. Such effective penalty
on the latter industries will make it unlikely that their products
could compete successfully with foreign-made goods in both domes-
tic and export markets. Lastly, if there is any lesson to be learned
from related experiences of South Korea and Taiwan in the second
half of the 1970's, it isthat moving hastily and indiscriminately into
heavy industries can lead to expansionary demand management and
high inflation rates. This is hardly a prospect that should confront
the Philippine economy at a time when it is most vulnerable to eco-
nomic instabilities•- whether externally or internally generated.•
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